‘Get out of Traian Square!’: Roma Stigmatisation as a Mobilising Tool for the Far Right in Timișoara, Romania

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Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank Nicholas Huntington, Ryan Powell and Duncan Light for comments on earlier drafts. We are also grateful for suggestions from the participants at the UACES CRN Workshop held at Canterbury Christ Church University in September 2017, where an earlier version of this paper was presented.
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Post-communist Central and Eastern Europe has seen far right movements and parties gain considerable ground by drawing on nativist and ethnic claims to call for a return to an imagined past. In Romania, far right groups have been able to capitalise on a sense of injustice while also playing on historically negative feelings towards the Roma community. These patterns have been seen in Timişoara where the group Noua Dreaptă (New Right) has established a foothold over the past decade by emphasising claims that blame Roma for loss of built heritage and corruption in the administration of property restitution. The aims of this paper are to 1) examine the emergence of Noua Dreaptă and its use of Roma stigmatisation, and 2) consider the ways extreme views are normalised by appealing to beliefs and perceptions. The findings of the paper show that pre-existing prejudices can be a powerful force to not just target marginalised communities, but also challenge administrative practices and build organisational support. Focusing at the level of the city, it is possible to identify the way these claims can be more precisely calibrated to draw on concerns that circulate within the community.

Keywords: Roma people, Radical Right, Stigmatisation, Timişoara, Romania, Populism

Introduction

The collapse of the totalitarian communist regimes in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union saw a dramatic upheaval in expectations and opportunities among their populations. These regimes had generated a degree of certainty for the majority of the population, which was rapidly lost in the post-communist transitions (Elster et al, 1998). Continued political contention and change has seen incumbent regimes challenged and forced resignations in some countries, through the Colour Revolutions and less spectacularly following protests in Bulgaria
and Romania (Bunce and Wolchik, 2011; Koycheva, 2016; Mărgărit, 2016). In this space, radical right groups have emerged, playing on themes of nationalism and ethnic purity (Mudde, 2005; Fox and Vermeersch, 2010). These groups have been successful in gaining political representation in some countries (Hungary, Poland), echoing a broader rise in right-wing populism and disillusionment following the onset of the global financial crisis in 2008 (Brusis, 2016; Gonzalez-Vincente and Carroll, 2017). Others have operated at lower levels, seeking to mobilise support to take more direct actions to reshape the social sphere (see Feischmidt and Szombati, 2016). It is therefore important to assess the origins of such movements, how they operate and the potential consequences for society in these countries.

Romania is one country that has seen a flourishing of far right groups and attitudes. Politicians such as Vadim Tudor were prominent during the early transition period, but subsequently faded from view as the country joined the EU (Crețan and Turnock, 2008; Crețan and Powell, 2018). Pressure from the EU to adopt certain practices has led to growing resentment in a number of areas, as the benefits of membership were muted by the global financial crisis (Sasse and Beissinger, 2013). In this context, New Right (ND - New Right) has emerged as a significant group, drawing on nativism and ethnicity to advance its claims (Climescu, 2013). Protest plays an important role in presenting these claims to power holders, generating a shared sense of identity and reinforcing categorical boundaries between groups. As Tilly (2003: 132) has argued, the ‘activation of available us-them boundaries’ is a key mechanism in various forms of collective action, with boundaries activated around issues such as religion, race or sexual identity. Vilification and stigmatisation of Roma is one issue that animates the group, as they perceive that the rights of native Romanians have been sacrificed in favour of special treatment of Roma and other minorities. Such perceptions and associated patterns of
stigmatisation are common across Eastern (and Western) Europe (Powell, 2008; Crețan and Powell, 2018).

This paper delves into the forms of Roma stigmatisation adopted by the ND through an examination of the group’s actions in the city of Timișoara, where such claims have centred on the built environment and cultural heritage. The aims of this paper are to 1) examine the emergence of Noua Dreaptă and its use of Roma stigmatisation, and 2) consider the ways extreme views are normalised by appealing to beliefs and perceptions. By connecting work on populism and nationalism (Mudde, 2005; Mudde, 2010; Fox and Vermeersch, 2010) with literature on Roma in Europe (Barany, 1998; Crețan and Powell, 2018; Hockenos, 1993; Powell, 2008; Powell and Lever, 2017) we link the case of Timișoara research to broader debates around urban mobilisation of radical right groups. Drawing on Fox and Veermersch’s (2010) notion of backdoor nationalism, the paper considers the way in which such ideas circulate and are mobilised by far right actors to support their claims. The focus on Timișoara allows us to identify the way radical right groups draw on localised concerns to generate support, linking administrative failure to prejudicial attitudes regarding marginalised communities. The remainder of the paper is divided into three sections. The first section outlines the nature of far right movements, considering the motivations and form. It also identifies the role of anti-Roma stigmatization as a key mobilising tactic. The methodology used to identify the claims and actions of the far right in Timișoara and the limitations of this approach are outlined in the second section. The operation of the far right in Timișoara is examined in the third section through an examination of the claims presented by ND and how these are facilitated by the urban environment and administrative practices.

**Positioning Far Right Movements and Strategies of Roma Stigmatisation**
Populism has gained traction in recent times, as diverse actors and groups have sought to challenge established practices and institutions. This form of representation rests on identifying and amplifying concerns and issues among the general population – speaking to ‘common sense’. In claiming to support neglected issues, populist actors are able to shift the discussion, creating or reinforcing feelings of disillusionment or cynicism (Högström, 2014). The focus on common sense and the people encourages an exclusionary view, based on conformity with accepted norms, singling out minorities. Supporting this point, Plattner (2010: 88) claims:

populist movements tend to be antagonistic to cultural, linguistic, religious, and racial minorities… who differ from the majority… [and are] viewed as enemies of the people rather than potential allies.

A key motivation in defining the represented group is the ‘activation of us-them boundaries’ that allow the reinforcement of identity bonds (Tilly, 2003: 132). Maintenance of group boundaries tends to emphasise ‘a rigid interpretation of the ideas of popular sovereignty and majority rule’ (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2013: 149). Visible minority groups present a more immediate and tangible target for such movements.

An important part of the growth of populism in Europe has been the emergence of radical right groups over the past decade. Vieten and Poynting (2016: 533) argue that ‘right-wing racist movements are on the march across the continent, with parliamentary beachheads in a number of nations, as well, of course, as the possibly disintegrating European parliament.’ This growth has led to attempts to understand their form and operation. A key distinction is made between extremist and radical right groups, based on the intensity of opposition to liberal democracy (Mudde, 2010). Halikiopoulou and Vasilopoulou (2016: 4) argue that ‘extreme
right…designates parties and groups which have not distanced themselves from fascism’ and that such groups ‘understand themselves primarily as movements from below that embody the will of the people rather than represent or speak on its behalf.’ Radical right groups, in contrast, are more closely aligned to representative goals and ‘seek to transform liberal democracy into an ethnocratic regime, which gives supremacy to the interests of “the people”’ (Betz and Johnson, 2004: 313). In order to achieve this goal, radical groups seek to distance themselves from more extreme elements and appeal to the ‘common sense of the ordinary people’ (Betz and Johnson, 2004: 315) by framing their values in civic terms (Halikiopoulou et al, 2013).

The motivations of radical right groups vary and are shaped by the specific context and perceived threats. They emerge in periods of socio-economic transition and target the losers, addressing issues such as unemployment, housing shortages and changes in socio-cultural patterns. In doing so, they construct a ‘recreation of a past, in terms of a singular, often linear, reading of the nation, history, culture, and people.’ (Kinnvall, 2015: 522). Emphasising the loss of an idealised past also calls into question the role of incumbent elites and their failure to protect the interests of the people (Kinnvall, 2015). Framing their appeal in opposition to the establishment enables supporters to claim that support ‘does not originate in hatred against minorities but rather in opposition to policies that accommodate their demands and the political advancement of minorities’ (Bustikova, 2014: 1741). Such an approach puts further distance from extremist actors and strengthens appeals to ‘common sense’.

The variety of radical right mobilisation raises further questions regarding their level of operation. Addressing the situation in Western Europe, Stockemer (2017: 1) argues forcefully that:
Operationalizing structural theories on the success of the radical right at the national level implies that the effect of immigration, unemployment or any other factor… on the radical right-wing vote is rather constant throughout the country. However, the empirical reality shows that this is not the case.

The reality is ‘support for the far right tends to be heavily concentrated in specific localities’ as symbolic work is required to define the identity that speaks to the context (Feischmidt and Szombati, 2016: 2). While such groups are geographically rooted, Zúquete (2015: 72) notes that there has been a growth in cooperation at the transnational level, giving ‘rise to a network through which individuals circulate, ideas are disseminated, information is exchanged, resources are mobilized and strategies are discussed’. There has been a growth in the scale of far-right mobilisation across Europe, with the Central and Eastern European region seeing an earlier and more intense mobilisation. Mudde (2005: 162-3) has argued that extremist groups in the region ‘are… postcommunist phenomena, addressing postcommunist issues (corruption, minorities, EU enlargement) rather than harking back to a communist or pre-communist past.’

The urban space provides fertile ground for the growth and development of such movements. Addressing the characteristics of urban social movements, Miller and Nicholls (2013: 493) argue against treating them ‘as distinctive movements in their own right, standing apart from other movements like those for civil rights or the environment’. Just as progressive movements exist on multiple levels and capitalise on the role of cities as ‘incubators and… platforms’ (Miller and Nicholls, 2013: 493), right-wing movements also utilise the opportunities presented. Lindqvist (2015: 39) reinforces the significance of the urban environment, noting ‘space is not a fixed “backdrop” to social life existing outside of, or framing everyday life, but instead is a transformative agent in itself’. In manipulating the opportunities afforded by the
city, movement actors seek to ‘transform places through their actions’ (McDaniel, 2014: 2). The socially defined nature of the urban environment means that actions taken to challenge or reinforce established norms and logics are important tactics. Hansen and Karpantschhof (2016: 178) argue that in Western Europe the ‘right to the city has been turned into a narrow, individual right, reserved for a limited economic and political elite’. In presenting their claims, right-wing groups challenge and reinforce patterns of exclusion.

An important target of far right movements in the CEE region is the Roma community, as regime change, marginalisation and a specific nationalist ethnopolitics have imposed a burden in the post-communist period. ‘Post-totalitarian freedom’ (Hockenos, 1993) and the search to re-define the relationship between the state and the nation imposed a heavy toll on Roma (see Crețan and Turnock, 2008; Vincze and Rat, 2013). Themes and stereotypes may change over time and vary by context, but Roma are seen as ‘the enemy’ in the transitional Romanian context (Goodwin et al, 2012). The marginal (socioeconomic) condition of urban Roma in Central and Eastern Europe has been highlighted in numerous studies. Their spatial reflection within urban ghettos is presented by a hostile environment (Crețan and Turnock, 2008; Vincze and Raț, 2013; Powell and Lever, 2017; Lancione, 2017, 2018). The long-term poverty of most of Roma communities and their segregation has determined a lack of access to education, labour market and housing (O’Nions, 2010; van Baar, 2011; 2012; Malovics et al., 2018). Roma poverty is constructed by the mainstream society in terms that position Roma as responsible for their own way of living (van Baar, 2011; Maestri, 2016; Filčák and Steger, 2014), an uneducated group that is dependent on public fares/state money (Grill, 2012).

The current trend emphasising segregation through the creation of neo-ghettos has been linked to economic and political interests (Clough Marinaro, 2015; 2017) and attempts to avoid
harassment (Filčák and Steger, 2014; Powell and Lever, 2017). The pressures on Roma housing in Romanian urban areas has been considered in Lancione’s (2017; 2018) and Chelcea’s ethnographic works (2003; 2012). Chelcea highlights the effects of nationalization of Romanian housing stock and suggests that the post-1989 housing restitution process led to strengthening of kinship solidarity, ancestor worship as well as intense public discussions about who counts as kin (2003; 2012). This is achieved through a critical engagement with forced evictions of poor Roma in Bucharest. Lancione’s (2018) recent work provides an understanding of urban precarity, embodiment and politics, identifying the ways in which it is both an embodied product and a producer of the urban political context. Forced evictions have a practical effect in removing a base from which Roma can exercise resistance, making them more pliant and containable (Lancione, 2017).

The advent of neoliberal forms of urban governance in the post-socialist context can be considered a key link between far right nationalism and stigmatisation of minority groups. Processes of reindustrialization and deindustrialization have led to ongoing unemployment and a continuing retraction of public services and resources. In addition to housing policies with legacies linked to the communist period, the post-socialist transition in housing has compounded the marginality of both the poor and the wealthy, as well as accentuating actions of anti-Romaism and territorial stigma. Post-1989 practices of nationalism and neoliberalism have thus contributed to new practices of anti-Romaism. In the context of EU enlargement, a complex relationship between anti-Roma sentiments and racism can be seen. Scholars who have analysed the more narrow nexus of race and neoliberalism (Wacquant, 2008) have also underlined the importance of how racialising discourses and practices have changed under the influence of neoliberalism and, consequently, how neoliberalism has affected the racial construction of ‘problem’ groups. In this respect, the historical continuity of racialising and
exclusionary practices towards the Roma can be considered a great burden for the ‘problem group’ of Roma today.

Identity trumps socioeconomic considerations, as even wealthy Roma are marginalised and seen as cheaters. The reproduction of misrepresentations is brought into the public space by the far right, leading to further discrimination. As a result, wealthy Roma are invariably stigmatised, as their spatiality reinforces ghettoisation and further emphasises stigma and separation. In addition, non-Roma become defensive when wealthy Roma live in central area neighbourhoods, which also leads to stigma (see Crețan and Powell, 2018). The building of large houses with turrets is part of their ‘we-image’, or identification. Middle-aged and older non-Roma individuals generally invalidated nationalists’ anti-Roma stigma discourses, though it seems that some of the young generation agree with such symbolic violence. As Powell and Lever (2017: 693) argue, the long history of Roma marginalisation ‘suggests much deeper and long-standing processes of disidentification and stigmatisation … which inform public attitudes and sentiments and shape public policy’.

Place-based stigmatisation of Roma is an important dimension of the extremist protesters’ treatment of Roma. Territorial discrimination leads to stress and anxiety (Keene and Padilla, 2014) and shame carried by those blamed (Slater and Anderson, 2012). The slogans used in protests contribute to these feelings. Such place-based stigmatisation undermines progressive social policy by pushing public officials to adopt strategies that counter efforts to support disadvantaged persons (Wacquant, 2008). Moreover, socially and economically differentiating processes between Roma and the dominant national ethnic group accumulate in neighbourhoods over time and give rise to actions of hatred and discrimination. Thus, external power relations generate a ‘blemish of place’ that denies acceptance of the Roma in the society.
The presence of Roma as a marginalised group in the urban space reflects deeper antagonisms within society. As Fox and Veermersch (2010) argue, EU accession has reduced the importance of left/right divisions, enabling other claims to take hold. Their focus on backdoor nationalism captures this dynamic, as groups define themselves against the EU at the national level. Such claims draw heavily on identity, as they attempt to bring together co-ethnics to create the idealised, unified state. At the urban level, claims against supra-national bodies are more difficult to sustain, leading to a sharper focus on localised concerns, which are still tied to identity. Groups seeking to mobilise support for their exclusivist claims draw on pre-existing, latent prejudices and beliefs, leading to a form of circulatory backdoor nationalism. In the case of Roma, the long history of stigmatisation means that prejudice circulates freely, providing a resource that can be used to target administrative failings, as well as Roma communities themselves, in mobilising support.

**Methods and empirical sources**

The empirical background of this paper is based on a mixed methods approach (Bryman, 2016). We use content analysis of urban policy documents released by Timişoara City Hall as well as discursive analysis of two daily Romanian newspapers (Adevarul, Timis online) which have specific editorials connected to the ND leaders’ blemish of place discourses against the Roma in Timişoara.

Census data for descriptive context as well as housing policy documents and reports provided from Timişoara City Council were analysed in order to perceive how the image of Roma living in Timişoara’s central area and Piața Traian are shaped. The main public policy frameworks on which urban plans of Timişoara is centered are the General Urban Plan and the Integrated
Development Plan. These urban development plans are the major empirical sources of the
content analysis that we followed in this paper. Interestingly, although for a so-called
multicultural city as Timișoara is envisioned by local policy-makers there is no specific
mention about the Roma people in these documents, we were more interested to see how
current housing policy is implemented to the city’s citizens and how former policies affected
the local Roma population.

A media and online platform (i.e. the ND website) was examined in order to better understand
the role and discourse of the media and the far-right nationalists against the Roma and the
territory they inhabit. Specific key-words (such as ‘Noua Dreaptă and Roma people in
Timișoara’, ‘Piața Traian and Roma housing”) on the internet were initiated for the selection
of one major national (Adevarul) and a local (Timis online) newspapers. Content analyses was
used to select signifiers in the nationalist discourses against the Roma and core slogans were
presented to show different levels of contention on the Roma and their inhabited spaces. The
timeframe of the analysis of the selected online archives of these newspapers is between
January 2011 and December 2016.

A limitation of the methodological approach in this paper is the necessity of using newspaper
editorials. We cannot claim to have achieved a representative sample. Indeed, the two selected
newspapers included the most relevant editorial titles we found but there were other
newspapers in Romania that showed the events related to how Noua Dreaptă actions impacted
on the Roma people in Timișoara. Our aim was to select quality and not quantity data and this
was the major reason we decided to select only the two journals. Additionally, previous drafts
of this paper included the monthly local city hall journal ’Monitorul’, where several of the
Mayor’s editorials were highly discriminatory against the local Roma and supported Noua
Dreaptă. These editorials were subsequently erased by the administrator of Monitorul’s website after the mayor was fined several times by CNCDR (the National Council for Fighting against Discrimination in Romania). Due to these events we were obliged to exclude this material.

The authors acknowledge the lack of Roma voices as a potential limitation of the current paper. The decision not to include Roma voices in this paper is to enable a sharper focus on the narratives and strategies adopted by the far right in Timişoara and how these are used to stigmatise Roma as a group. It also enables consideration of the way this approach fits with broader attitudes, existing practices and the material reality of life in the city. There is considerable scope for further research to examine how members of the Roma community interiorise and manage this stigmatisation by the far right and how it reflects their perception of wider social practices.

**Far Right Contention against the Roma in Timişoara**

In the case of Romania, nationalist ideology developed quickly after the fall of the Communist regime and spread across the political spectrum. Two ultra-nationalist parties emerged on the Romanian political landscape: the Greater Romania Party (*Partidul România Mare*) and the Romanian Cradle (*Vatra Româneasca*) (Gallagher, 1995). Although neither party has had a significant impact on the conduct of politics at the national level, their presence has been important in legitimising more extreme positions. These parties are complemented by many fragmented but active ultra-nationalist organisations, leading to a more militant far right sector than in Western Europe (Goodwin et al, 2012). Although not consolidated as a unified political force until 2015, the far right in Romania acts through organisations or associations with legal personality – despite the existence of legislation against the promotion of fascist symbols,
racism and xenophobia – and ‘sometimes in complicity with state institutions’ (Climescu, 2013: 5).

Roma feature as the target of many of the claims presented by far right groups in Romania. Policies of multiculturalism and inclusion promoted by public institutions in favour of ethnic minorities, including the Roma, has fuelled discontent among parts of the population. Right-wing movements have used these developments as a tool to mobilise support against Roma as a threat to national ‘purity’ (Kuhelj, 2014). Csepeli and Simon (2004: 129) argue that the construction of the Roma population is ‘more or less homogenous, stereotypical and fraught with negative bias’, which clashes with what Barany (1998: 312) has referred to as ‘the amazing diversity among Romani communities with clear-cut distinctions in occupation, language/dialect, lifestyle, geographic location, socio-economic status and religion’. Their ability to challenge these external understandings is undermined by the lack of ‘effective formal representation, in terms of voice and presence in public life’ (McGarry, 2014: 757). A discourse of ‘Gypsy deviance’ emerged (Picker and Rocchegianni, 2014), stigmatising Roma communities as hotbeds of prostitution and begging. Although nationalist leaders have repeatedly emphasised these issues to attract voters and sympathisers (Creţan and Powell, 2018) they remain anchored in localised realities.

The most organised far-right movement in Romania is Noua Dreaptă (ND - New Right), which was founded in 1999 and uses the symbol of the Celtic cross (typically drawn on a green background) that is reminiscent of the insignia of the fascist Iron Guard that was dominant during the interwar and early war period. The group defines itself as ‘radical, militant, nationalist and Christian Orthodox’ (Noua Dreaptă, 2014). They use imagery associated with legionarism, the ideology of the extreme nationalist and anti-Semitic interwar Iron Guard,
which was created by the notorious Hitler-admirer Corneliu Zelea Codreanu and routinely referenced the fascist and Nazi movements in Italy and Germany (see Noua Dreaptă, 2014). According to the ND, there is no place for national minorities, and ND members fight to build an ‘ethnocratic state’ ruled exclusively by pure Romanians; they are against the ‘Gypsy danger’, are in favour of stiff punishment for ‘Gypsy crimes’ and fight to confine all Roma to ‘reservation camps’ (Climescu, 2013). They blame the Romanian State for what is generically called the ‘Gypsy problem’ that has resulted from the failure of the state to counter ‘Mafia Gypsy’ activities and to prohibit real estate transactions concluded by Roma (Noua Dreaptă, 2014).

The motivations of the ND are also reflected in their actions, reinforcing boundaries between the pure, native population and the other. This leads to a situation where the group has been involved in performing charitable actions for some elderly living in the countryside, while at the same time developing a reputation for cruelty over the last decade. ND emerged as a localised extremist radical right group, but they have moderated their message and attempted to move into the electoral space with the formation of Partidul Noua Dreaptă (New Right Party) in 2015. The use of violence by the group suggests that rather than seeking to represent the interests of a particular group, they see themselves as the embodiment of the people (see Halikiopoulou and Vasilopoulou, 2016). The targets of their protests also illustrate the strong connection to a particular idea of Romania and Romanian identity. During the GayFest pride parade held in Bucharest in May 2006, Romanian police arrested dozens of ND members who violently disrupted the parade. Moreover, on the occasion of the National Day of Hungary (15 March) in 2008, ND members organised an anti-Hungarian rally in Cluj-Napoca (Noua Dreaptă, 2014) – an action in which ND group members beat an ethnic Hungarian organiser. Minority groups present a simple target and enable the group to reinforce identified boundaries
between us and them, thereby strengthening internal solidarity and communicating values to observers.

The Roma population of Timişoara is 3,062, or less than 1.0% of the city’s population of 317,660 inhabitants. Romanians make up the overwhelming majority of the population (85.5%) with smaller Hungarian (7.6%) and German (2.3%) communities also being recorded (INSSE, 2013). Most Roma in Timişoara (about 90 percent) are poor, having a family income (around 400 euros) much under the lowest measured gross salary in Romania (1900 RON). They live usually in large families (3 to 7 children) at the edge or in the poorer areas of the city. Areas of Roma habitation include the Kunz quarter (living in substandard conditions in the northeast of Timişoara), Piaţa Traian in the centre, and in the neighbourhoods of city's three railway stations. As in the case of Bucharest (see Lancione, 2017; 2018) and even in other urban and rural areas in Romania, Roma in Timişoara have no working places or rely on lowly paid activities such as collecting garbage or collecting iron objects to sell for subsistence. Some Roma, such as those in southern part of the city, became even poorer after industrial activities associated with clay-brick making stopped in the post-1989 period due to competition. Roma access to employment is limited due to society’s stereotypes regarding Roma.

At the other extreme are the wealthy Roma who either are historically wealthy due to traditional family wealth (goldsmiths, musicians) or become wealthy by undertaking seasonal work abroad (see Creţan and Powell, 2018). Wealthy Roma have used their money to build large homes in the central city and on the outskirts. These houses are visible in the housing landscape, as their owners add turrets to demonstrate pride and their ethnic identification (Creţan and Powell, 2018). Roma in Timişoara are largely divided into poor and wealthy, as the absence of
opportunities means that middle-class Roma are few in number. This stratification plays into the prejudiced arguments that are perpetuated about Roma in the city.

As a visible minority facing discrimination in society, the Roma community presents a clear target for the ND, as the group is able to build on existing narratives to focus their claims and actions. As Kinnvall (2015) argues, the strength of the claims presented can be bolstered by linking actions to elements of culture and history. Such a connection is apparent in ND’s targeting of Roma living in historical areas of Timişoara. Both poor Roma from the Piaţa Traian area and the wealthy Roma from the central city currently live mainly in historical buildings (Creţan and Powell, 2018). In presenting their claims, the ND anti-Roma mobilization campaign starts from the fear that Roma would build turrets on historical houses they occupy and abuse these buildings. In the following we examine recent housing laws to determine rights and responsibilities regarding property before considering how the ND has been able to generate anti-Roma mobilisations by drawing on existing narratives of stigma.

An important development in the post-communist period was the introduction of national laws regarding houses that had been nationalised under the previous regime (see also Chelcea, 2003, 2012). In the communist times after ethnic Jews and Germans emigrated from Romania many Romanian and other ethnic group including the Roma were offered by local authorities to be tenants in the former nationalised houses from central area, including the Piaţa Traian area. The 1990s Housing Restitution laws gave any citizen of Romania the opportunity to acquire a former nationalised house. Some wealthy and poor Roma families were able to buy some of the former nationalised houses in central area, leading to a mixing of the population, breaking with traditional neighbourhood compositions.
The Integrative Development Plan (IDP) – the major document of Timișoara’s Townhall – states that the vision of city’s development plan sits under the umbrella of an ‘integrative and avant-garde multicultural space’ (Paddison et al, 2015). The multicultural and diversity myths are reinforced in the General Urban Plan (GUP) of the city and emphasises the role of social inclusion of the poor (e.g., the Roma) in the modernised city community (Paddison et al, 2015). Such a vision strengthens anti-Roma sentiment and the idea that Roma are seen ‘as the marginals who seek to hide behind the cover of a highly protected minority in a liberal multicultural world’ (Noua Dreaptă, 2014). Data from IDP and GUP show that Roma in Timișoara make up only one percent of the population, while field observations show that they are occupying less than a quarter of the housing in Piața Traian. These data suggest that while Piața Traian does have a higher concentration of Roma, it is not a majority Roma area as the ND contends, rather the concentration enables a narrative to be constructed by stigmatising particular places.

ND protests challenging the presence and rights of the Roma have taken place in Timișoara each autumn from 2011. Gathering in this way enables the group to demonstrate the legitimacy of the claims being presented by signifying what Tilly and Wood have called WUNC (worthiness, unity, numbers and commitment) (Tilly and Wood, 2009). The key claim being presented in the rallies has been the need to challenge the ‘Roma mafia clans’ real estate’ and the blemished area, Piața Traian. Their routes typically pass through the Prefecture / County Council, City Hall, and stopped at Piața Traian before ending in front of the Court of Justice (Both, 2011; Timis Online, 2011) (Figure 1). In selecting this route they are able to highlight the main source of their discontent while also placing pressure on the governing institutions responsible for managing urban planning. Press releases reveal that the ND has chosen to demonstrate in front of these institutions because its leadership believes that the Roma real
estate ‘mafia’ could not seize these historic buildings downtown without ‘the complicity of local authorities, the police and the corrupt magistrates’ (Both, 2011). They also consider Piața Traian as a prime example of Roma overpopulating an area ‘which did not belong to them’ (Noua Dreaptă, 2014).

In a press interview with a local ND leader it was found that the ND did not consider the initiative to tax cemetery turrets as an adequate measure to solve the ‘Roma problem’ (Both, 2011). The local administration law on cemetery turrets in Timișoara targeted the Roma and conflated a general opinion with a revenge attitude aimed at the entire Roma community. He argued that ‘Gypsies will make money from prostitution and begging to pay taxes for turrets and they need better and smarter solutions’. Furthermore, he decried the changes made to the historical buildings in which Roma live (Both, 2011), arguing that the:

Muhle house and Paediatric Hospital are part of our cultural heritage and Gypsies broke down their roofs, changed their facade, adding turrets... We have to put pressure on the authorities to stop Gypsies’ authoritarian power… They are pick-pockets and beggars abroad but here they have luxurious cars and estates.

Significantly, the ND leader stated that their organisation has nothing against the Roma ethnicity but against ‘the individuals behind the mask of multiculturalism, inclusion and tolerance who commit crimes and abuses against Romanian people’ (Both, 2011). The ND leader states that: ‘It is not our fault that an overwhelming majority of the Gypsy population

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1 Turrets are recognised as symbols of the Roma community (see Crețan and Powell, 2018).
prefers to steal, bully and beg instead of working. The law is too permissive towards overt abuses committed against normal people by ethnic Gypsies’ (Both, 2011). Headlines used in a local Timișoara newspaper like ‘Far-right raises against the Roma mafia estate clans’ (Timis Online, 2011) also seemed to deeply influence the nationalist discourse of far-right hatred against the Romani people. Far-right anti-Roma sentiment is thus visible in terms connected to ‘urbanization’ of the city. The far right members slogans as ‘Down with the turrets from houses in Timișoara’ or the chants connected to the ugliness of the façade of Roma houses are typical in this respect. It is considered that both wealthy Roma housing bearing turret-styles and poor Roma living in low-standard houses in the Piața Traian and other areas determine an affront to the beautification of the city.

Interestingly, the ND website reveals that only by such loud voices can they ensure that their opinions are listened to and that the audience better perceives their contention. ND leaders measured ‘territorial stigma’ as the best solution for alerting the authorities that Piața Traian is ‘a dominant Gypsy place’, whereas increasing the number of Gypsies would ‘bring illness’ and create a place where ‘children are afraid to go out in the evening’ (Noua Dreaptă, 2014). Thus, a no-go space is portrayed in which last levels of society are dominant (see Slater and Anderson, 2012). The ND also offers information about the need for ‘harsh measures against Gypsies’ and election of more nationalist politicians who care about Romanian citizens. The current situation is portrayed as one in which ‘the law is very mild and that a Gypsy should stay imprisoned more for a delinquency like illegally owning real estate... In Romania prisons are so overcrowded that Gypsies are back begging on the streets’ (Both, 2011). Finally, they consider their protest movements had resulted in benefits for the ND as the City Council of Timișoara has begun an inquiry to examine changes made to historic buildings in the city.
Online and written press releases characterised an identifiable variety of slogans. For instance, the 2011 event brought out several harsh slogans, which reiterated historical and nationalist stereotypes, such as Roma carrying illness and operating as criminals (‘Out, out with lepers in the country’, ‘Timişoara does not tolerate criminals’), who should go to jail at Jilava (one of the harshest Romanian prisons, located near Bucharest) because their ‘Gypsy’ behaviour should not be tolerated (‘Our city does not tolerate Gypsiness’, ‘Come on, to Jilava for all Gypsies!’). The Roma beggar and wealthy musician stigma is also reinforced (‘Do not give money to the Gypsy, it goes to musicians’), thereby removing differences between Roma based on socio-economic status. Thus, far right groups contend that Roma are criminals, beggars and thieves and call for harsh treatment on this basis.

An important element of ND claims is the reference to past practices, in particular the WWII period and the regime of Ion Antonescu (1940-44). As leader of the fascist Iron Guard, Antonescu organised pogroms in which approximately 11,000 Roma were murdered in territories under Romanian control (Clark, 2012, 305). Despite this, anti-Roma sentiment persists, as deep-seated prejudices reinforced during the communist period are slow to change (Kelso, 2013). Noua Dreaptă followed most of Antonescu’s regime principles against the Roma people, meaning they consider Roma among ‘undesirable populations’ which needs to be deported. The reference to the past and the strength of hostility to the Roma community is reflected in the slogan, ‘If Antonescu were alive, he would have sent you to Siberia’. The presentation of Siberia as a slogan including a place of deportation for the Roma harks back to Antonescu’s principles. Additionally, they claim that the Roma came to Timişoara from other parts of Romania, challenging the idea of a historical multicultural city and questioning their presence.
At the 2012-2015 rallies, the ND’s repertoire had a ‘nationalist justice-oriented approach’. They commonly used the following chants: ‘Gypsies and Mafia corrupt reputation’, ‘Gypsies, Romania is not yours’, ‘Gypsies, get out of Traian Square’, ‘Timișoara does not tolerate Gypsyness’, ‘Do not give money to Roma beggars because they are criminals’ and ‘Social justice breaks national law’. In addition, two banners were displayed with the following messages: ‘No Gypsy clans in Romanian towns’ and ‘Safer cities without Gypsies’. ‘Gypsies, get out of Traian Square!’ is a typical slogan invoking territorial stigmatisation. Examining the significance of territorial stigma, Waquant, Slater and Perreira (2014: 1273) argue that it:

is closely tied to, but has become partially autonomized from, the stain of poverty, subaltern ethnicity (encompassing national and regional ‘minorities’, recognized or not, and lower-class foreign migrants), degraded housing, imputed immorality, and street crime. So much so that a new generic label has gained wide currency in advanced countries to designate those urban districts viewed as tears in, and threats to, the fabric of the nation

Such recurrent symbolic power and violence reveals hatred of the poor and of the entire space inhabited by Roma. Piața Traian and central area of Timișoara are used as sites of contention because they are imaginatively considered the ‘new Roma housing landscape’ which might be replaced by Romanians.

This ‘Roma out of place’ narrative is not new in nationalist rallies, as it reflects deeper, historical manifestations of racial discrimination that exist across Europe (Goodwin et al, 2012). The blemish associated with Roma places is also not new in Romanian extremist culture – Roma ghettos and Roma luxurious houses have routinely been invoked by nationalist leaders.
and journalists. Consequently, urban marginalisation and the territorial stigmatisation that follows it targets not only poor but also wealthy Roma (Crețan and Powell, 2018). Such a casting of identity allows ND to continue to reinforce their categorical boundaries by removing nuance in the identification of groups within society.

Considering the actions of ND in Timișoara it is possible to reconsider some of the themes that characterise far right movements. The first point to note is that the localised nature of the mobilisation is significant in this regard, as it enables the group to enrol commonly recognised beliefs within society. The slogan ‘Get Out of Traian Square!’ exemplifies this practice, as it draws on localised knowledge and perceptions of the current occupants of Piața Traian. Targeting the claim in this way also enables activists to use the affordances of space to demonstrate the connection between the stigmatised area and the places of power in the city. By marching past Piața Traian, the county council, city hall and court of justice (see Fig 1) they attempt to locate responsibility for dealing with the threat they have constructed. Additionally, marching in this manner seeks to reclaim the space and demonstrate their WUNC, drawing on recognisable repertoires and appealing to wider perceptions and concerns regarding the target group.

Another feature that is central to the actions of ND in Timișoara is the designation of the ‘other’ as threatening to the majority. The slogans identified in ND actions centre on issues of criminality (‘Roma beggars... are criminals’), identity (‘Gypsies, Romania is not yours’) and security (‘Safer cities without Gypsies’), challenging the right of the Roma community to be part of society. These efforts also seek to identify the Roma as a unified group, acting in concert, illustrated by reference to ‘Mafia’ and ‘Gypsy clans’ that suggest a collective that has the potential to threaten those outside, specifically ethnic Romanians. As noted above,
distinctions based on socioeconomic status are obscured, with talk of mafia and clans providing a narrative that can explain hierarchies within the community. Difference is also reinforced with reference to claims regarding the abuse and supposed destruction of cultural heritage, through building works undertaken to alter historic buildings.

The effect of ND actions is more difficult to determine and at the local level the distinctions between radical and extremist groups may appear to soften. The rejection and critique of the officials in the city administration suggests a rejection of attempts to gain electoral office and the links to the Iron Guard clearly manifest fascist tendencies and beliefs. However, the ability of the group to engage supporters for annual marches and representation of the views of their leaders in the media suggest that they are not as marginalised from the views of ordinary people as may be expected. Acting at the local level, the group is able to identify a clear target in the role of the administration (those in power) protecting their rights at the expense of the majority. The reaction of the city administration in attempting to regulate the construction of turrets may suggest some ability to influence developments. Such changes may also represent the ability of the group to tap into and highlight existing tensions within the wider population (even if not vocalised).

The actions of ND in Timişoara confirm the contention of Feischmidt and Szombati (2016) that support for such groups tends to be concentrated in specific localities. Place and identity are key in enabling the group to mobilise support. However, the availability of recognisable claims regarding the threat posed by Roma to the purity of the Romanian nation suggest that while the specifics are shaped by the context, there is scope for mobilisation at higher scales. The focus here has been on Timişoara and the way in which the context has shaped their actions, but attacks on an anti-pride march in Bucharest and anti-Hungarian attack in Cluj-
Napoca suggest that the group is willing and able to mobilise against different minorities in different places as the opportunity arises, reinforcing the significance of local context.

**Conclusion**

The rise of far right movements has accelerated as the effects of the global financial crisis have led to disillusionment with politics and fostered the rise of populist actors and claims. The CEE region has experienced significant upheaval in this regard, as the promises of democratisation have failed to materialise. Additionally, the perceived transfer of political power from national parliaments to supranational bodies has reinforced the feeling that control has been lost (Mény and Surel 2002). In this environment of disillusionment, challenges to the state are increasingly frequent and visible (see Mărgărit, 2016; Musić, 2013). Appeals to nativism can in this way provide a form of security, as appeals are made to strengthen the nation in the face of threats (Mudde, 2010). In extreme cases, appeals to national identity can lead to large-scale conflict and even state breakdown (see Ritter, 2017). Claims based on identity are fostered by far right groups to mobilise support and acceptance for their views, leading to the idealisation of an imagined past and the stigmatisation of minority groups who do not fit the narrative (Fox and Vermeersch, 2010). At the urban scale, such claims rely on a form of circulatory backdoor nationalism, as they tap into rooted beliefs and prejudices in society regarding particular communities regarded as other.

This paper has addressed radical right mobilisation through a case study of processes of stigmatisation against the Roma community in Timișoara. The argument presented has sought to challenge the basic assumptions of the theory of stigmatisation, that such stigma is limited to the poor, and highlight the need to understand mobilization against particular minority groups, regardless of socioeconomic status. Contrary to the belief that territorial stigma is
partially autonomised from other types of stigmatisation (Wacquant, 2008; Wacquant, et al 2014), this paper suggests that territorial, ethnic and class stigma are very much aligned, feeding off each other and amplifying the dynamics of nationalism. The success of ND in generating support was shaped by the ability to tie its claims to existing perceptions and prejudices that circulate within society. By drawing on culturally and historically recognised symbols they were able to reinforce the boundary between the Roma and non-Roma communities.

Examining the case of ND in Timișoara also suggests a need to reconsider the clear distinction between extremist and radical right groups (see Mudde, 2010). The group’s actions were tied to localised concerns to mobilise potential supporters, looking back to idealised depictions of Romanian society, thereby habituating the population to their actions and normalising the claims being made. Linking the stigmatisation of the Roma community to concerns around crime, security, and clan behaviour enabled ND to build on and reinforce feelings circulating within the community. The formation of Partidul Noua Dreaptă suggests a further attempt to normalise these claims, bringing them into the electoral arena and boosting their acceptability. The urban form of ND and its targeting of varied minorities in different contexts reflects its adaptability and capacity to tap localised concerns to mobilise support. Although the stigmatised group differs in each case, the process of drawing on and amplifying commonly accepted beliefs within society provides a base with which to generate wider support.

Urban territorial stigmatisation feeds far right mobilisation and influences the treatment of minorities such as the Roma as undesirable subjects, generating narratives of majority belonging and solidarity. Viewed in this light, the recent urban anti-Roma mobilisations in Timișoara are significant, as they reinforce the circulation of racist attitudes and normalise the
actions of the far right. Therefore, the ability of the state to resist far right claims regarding minority communities rests on its ability to overcome or challenge the circulation of beliefs and prejudices in society that scapegoat minority communities for social and administrative failings. The growing strength of the far right in Timişoara and the increasingly hostile stance of the city administration demonstrates the way circulation of prejudice becomes a perpetual process. Further research in this area should consider the strength of existing prejudicial beliefs and the way they circulate within society to determine how they are able to be mobilised and can be challenged.
References


